Invisible Hours, Uncertain Wages: An Empirical-Legal Analysis of Uncompensated Approach Travel and Algorithmic Control in Jaipur's Platform Mobility Sector

Abstract

Although platform-based ride-hailing services have expanded earning opportunities and mobility options, driver payment systems come with high operating costs and a significant amount of unpaid work (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2021; Mishel, 2018). The paper seeks to investigate whether the distance and time needed to travel to a passenger ("approach travel" or "deadhead transit") gets reflected in the net earnings of the drivers. Moreover, rather than relying on questionable national statements, this study bases its empirical analysis on data from the urban transport market in Jaipur, Rajasthan, using an operational dataset of  completed rides. Through the use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) econometric regressions, this paper finds that unpaid pick-up distance significantly and negatively affects the booking returns (  and real hourly earnings (). Trips with approach distances greater than 4.5 km decrease net hourly income by 49.3% compared to short approaches (decreasing from ₹197.87/hr to ₹100.38/hr). This study will assess the statutory "worker" category of the UK as per Uber BV v. Aslam (2021) as well as the legal subordination (lien de subordination juridique) of France via its Cour de cassation in light of comparative labor jurisprudence. This paper analyzes the Code on Social Security (2020) and the Rajasthan Platform Based Gig Workers (Registration and Welfare) Act (2023). We observe that although Rajasthan offers a novel welfare platform, there is a lack of regulation in the area of working hours and deadhead trips, which exposes drivers to financial risks. We propose regulatory reforms that include pre-acceptance disclosure obligations, state aggregator regulations on deadhead allowances, and protection from algorithmic penalties, implementable in Rajasthan and elsewhere in India.