

The Impact of Economic and Technological Competition Between China and the United States on the Geopolitical Structure and Strategic Alliances in the Middle East in the 21st Century

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Abstract

This study analyzes the growing economic and technological rivalry between China and the United States, how it is transforming the political landscape, and how it is reshaping alliances in the Middle East. The focus of the study is Israel, and more specifically the strategic competition between its long-standing relationship with the US and its burgeoning economic relationship with China. This study is significant for both identifying how emerging powers and regional actors reformulate their foreign policies, investments, and security policies in response to an increasingly multipolar world and for interacting with new powers who claim a techno-capitalist identity. Using qualitative research methods and semi-structured interviews, this work used purposive sampling and consulted with 40 experts, a mix of academics, policymakers, and journalists. The findings informed multiple research recommendations with respect to: Israel's innovation policy, foreign aid to advancement technologies, the future of trade routes and lasting security, cybersecurity priorities for trade routes, military posture, and where countries look to leverage political powers, and closer ties or legitimacy by being less antagonistic with China. In conclusion, the research finds that Israel's foreign/posture largely reflects a regional trend towards expanding networks of state partnerships, and a desire to maintain a minimal capability to become a superpower that enhance their security profile as China and the US remain locked in rivalry with one another. In some cases, the research recommends that policymakers really take the time to develop forward thinking strategies to inform diplomatic options like having room to be responsive in their diplomacy over time and in a manner that minimizes the impact of global rivalries on their sovereignty & regional stability. This study theoretically contributes to the discussions about the significance of managing multipolarity and unpacking techno-geopolitics. Practically, it serves as a starting point for policymakers on the 21st century challenges of responding to superpower rivalries.

Keywords: U.S.-China rivalry, geopolitical structure, strategic alliances, Middle East, Israel, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), techno-capitalism, cybersecurity, economic diplomacy, multipolarity, foreign policy, energy markets, technological competition.

1. Introduction

This study aims to investigate how the intensifying economic and technological competition between China and the United States is reshaping the geopolitical structure and strategic alliances in the Middle East, with a particular emphasis on Israel. Through seven research questions, the thesis examines key areas such as the role of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), technological cooperation, digital innovation, cybersecurity, military engagement, trade dynamics, and energy markets. The overarching rationale is to understand how Israel and neighboring countries perceive and subsequently shape their foreign policy and strategic choices amidst increasingly global polarization. The contribution of this study is to delineate how Israel, while remaining aligned closely with the U.S., also

seeks to economic benefit from Chinese investment and regional integration and in doing so, reveal novel approaches for foreign party engagement in diplomacy, in a coming multipolar world.

This study's scope reflects the 21st century's US-China rivalry as techno-capitalism, competition based on innovation, and geo-economic power (Rolf & Schindler, 2022; Zhang, 2024) define this relationship. Key terms like "technology decoupling," "strategic alignment," "cybersecurity sovereignty," and "geo-economic diplomacy" permeate the conceptual boundaries of this study framework. The Middle East, specifically Israel, is a salient profile for study due to some of these countries' positions both in U.S. security considerations and increasingly within China's economic deliberations. This research establishes the critique of the Belt and Road Initiative (Ghani &

Khan, 2022) and U.S. national security legislation like the CHIPS Act (Kawar, 2023) as partly descriptive of how states use these tools to influence state behavior, infrastructure development, and participation in multinational negotiations. The concept of "multipolarity" is also an important framing method to understand how nations like Israel move from a binary loyal position of alignment-based decisions to increasing hybrid foreign policy choices.

The significance of this study is based upon the "real-time" dynamic changes in regional and global politics, and, in particular, Israel's challenge of balancing strategic autonomy versus subverting to great powers. The research questions challenge important dilemmas as to how Israel sustains its innovation economy without sacrificing national security; how it engages in China's infrastructure diplomacy; and how its regional alignment positions are affected by external pressures. The qualitative methodology for analyzing the examples captured in this study was constructed from observations of in-depth interviews and document analysis (DeJonckheere & Vaughn, 2019; Braun & Clarke, 2022) capturing more nuanced nuances and expert opinion than quantitative exercises can account for, while having uniquely situated findings mainly on the previous researcher's aim to add clarity and understanding with respect to decision-making activity based evidence collection; strategic execution; and planning leverage. The study contributes to international relations debates currently taking place and generally; the study adds more affirmation about how regional powers receive, respond to, and then adjust to adjustments and coalesce interests while at the same time still maintaining authority in their diplomacy. At base, this study contributes evidence-based observations on the balancing acts regional powers are trying to navigate, but more importantly, are aimed at informing the strategic clarity for policymakers moving forward who have, along with their partners, sovereignty in an increasingly fragmented world order.

2. Literature Review

2.1 U.S.-China Global Rivalry in the 21st

2.2 Century

The U.S.-China rivalry for global dominance in the 21st century is primarily about techno capitalism and economic power (Rolf & Schindler, 2022). Both countries are employing advanced industrial policies and geoeconomics strategies to compete for global leadership in emerging technologies, particularly in sectors that are closely related to state power like artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and 5G (Zhang, 2024). China has gone from being a dependent and technology importer to being a leading innovator and investor because of state sponsored policies, strategic state investment, and large-scale initiatives like "Made in China 2025" and China's Belt and Road Initiative (Ryan & Burman, 2024). The U.S. has also moved from a more traditional market driven approach to one that is more interventionist by taking legislative action such as export restrictions and the CHIPS Act to protect its technological leadership and power (Kawar, 2023). However, the U.S.-China rivalry is more than just economic competition, it has national security, prolific ambassadorial approaches, and innovation meanings as both countries demonstrably want to be self-sufficient and competent in technology and by extension influence geoeconomic standards and substandard practices. Therefore, the outcome is a technology decoupling of sorts (Zhang, 2024). The U.S.-China rivalry is changing how countries think of technology and their industries and fundamentally dividing the world into competing U.S. and Chinese tech spheres that leave countries with the choice to choose sides or to balance the relationship between the world powers (Winkler, 2023).

According to Vinodan and Kurian (2022), The existing U.S.-China global rivalry in the 21st century premieres a profound alteration of the international distribution of power as China's rapid ascent threatens the traditional American-led hegemonic order. While both China's and the U.S.'s social structures and ideological narratives differ drastically, there are symbiotic constructs that anchor both countries together; thus, it seems as if another recent construct is their mutual dependence on each other—the economic interdependence has exponentially grown in trade—the interdependence in relation to global issues such as climate change and terrorism.

2.3 The United States in the Middle East

The United States' engagement in the Middle East has evolved dramatically over time and especially over the past years (Fang & Lu, 2021). This dramatic change reflects internal metamorphoses regarding American role in the region and the external reality for the United States in the region (Fang & Lu, 2021). Historically, American engagement in the Middle East was characterized primarily by strategic interests such as securing oil supplies, supporting Israel, countering the Soviet Union, and combating terrorist groups (Armutlu, 2024). For example, through the Gulf War, the United States embarked on a different set of military engagements - those that were more aggressive and interventionist – to demonstrate American military power and promote democracy, and to reduce the role of extremist groups in the region (Chivvis et al., 2024). Since 2011, beginning with the Obama Administration, the United States has retreated from active military engagement in the region. The shift occurred as a result of the desire of the American public to end "endless wars" as well as new realities emerging in the region, and more importantly within the United States itself (Schulhofer-Wohl, 2021). New areas of interest included changes in energy dependence with the development of technologies such as fracking, as well as a strategic pivot to deal with Russia and China (Schulhofer-Wohl, 2021). Nonetheless, while the U.S. military presence and role in Iraq and Afghanistan were reduced, and military engagement in Syria and Libya did not occur, the United States did not completely disengage from the Middle East. Indeed, Washington continues to prioritize the same issues as in years prior, which are 1) preventing nuclear proliferation with Iran, 2) antiterrorism, 3) the safety and support of allies in the region - Israel, and 4) asserting U.S. influence in a region that is very important to U.S. strategies (Katulis et al., 2025). Therefore, while the way in which the United States engages with the Middle East has changed from one characterized by military involvement to one of more strategic, calculated, and selective involvement, the Middle East remains an important aspect of American foreign policy in the context of a changing global reality and domestic political pressures (Ashford, 2018).

2.4 China in the Middle East

China's role in the Middle East has changed significantly over the past two decades, driven

primarily by China's geo-economic interests more than military leverage or hegemonic motivations (Ghani & Khan, 2022). Although previously a peripheral player, China is increasingly seeing this region as significant regarding energy security, industrial investment, and diplomatic access as the world's largest importer of crude oil for nearly a decade (Al Shidhani & Baig, 2024). Given its massive population and sustained economic development, China imports significant energy resources to supply its economy, and it has worked to cultivate different types of bilateral relationships with several different Middle Eastern countries while investing in significant capital in economic infrastructure, and offering military hardware and trade agreements with compatible aspiration and mutual benefit (Hasan, 2023). Policies like the Belt and Road Initiative and China Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) assist China in promoting regional cooperation within the established principle of non- intervention, using partnerships and doors for soft power instead of pursuing outright hegemonic access of military intervention, using its own resources as benevolence, in exchange for deeper regional reliance (Bush, 2021). Important considerations have made confident aspirations to resist the military presence of the West more appealing to some states in the Middle East with vassal states hunting for autonomy after events like the uprising in Egypt after the Arab Spring and preceding the Iraq War (Fleming, 2021). In the context of developing an alternative, centrist or non-aligned foreign policy, the working compression of the Chinese development schedule on alienation further suited criteria of mutual cooperation with pre-existing, economic relationships with China during crisis and distasteful Western motives help create positive associations with China as a crucial encountered player to use in resisting challenges in achieving a more multipolar Middle East (Chivvis, 2024).

2.5 Israel between United States and China

Israel occupies a complicated and increasingly precarious position in its relations with the United States and China amid rising global rivalry. While China has become a significant economic partner for Israel—particularly through technology collaboration, trade, and infrastructure investments—Israel's long-standing strategic ally,

the United States, restricts this relationship (Sobol, 2022). The U.S. has long tracked, influenced, and at times blocked aspects of Sino-Israeli cooperation, especially in areas involving advanced technology and sensitive infrastructure related to national security (Shichor, 2025). The U.S. objections to the Phalcon radar deal, the recent controversy over the Chinese role in both the Haifa port and the Sorek B desalination plant, illustrate the strength of U.S. objections (Kumaraswamy, 2013). In recent years, utilizing both the Trump Administration and the Biden Administration, the U.S. has ramped up the pressure on Israel—including measures intended to curb Chinese investment in sensitive Israeli infrastructure, urging Israel to implement regulatory measures, which resulted in the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Investment (recommendations from both the Trump Administration and Biden Administration), and excluding China from certain aspects of projects (such as 5G networks) (Sobol, 2022). Both domestic factors and external pressure have left Israel balancing legitimate national security issues with economic reality, while attempting to stake out an independent position and avoid being seen as a proxy in a superpower clash.

3. Material and Methods

This research uses qualitative research methodology because it is the best fit to study the situation and its political and strategic decision-making context influenced by the economic and technological competition between the United States and China in the Middle East with a specific focus on Israel. Qualitative methods are often appropriate for research that investigates complex behaviors, strategies, perceptions, and relationships that cannot adequately be experienced with numerical data (Ugwu & Eze, 2023). Sarwono (2022) explains that qualitative inquiries have the capacity to foster the greater depth of understanding about social and political realities in contexts which are historically, ideologically, and strategically influenced. Flick (2018) also advocates for qualitative research design in political and social research, emphasizing its ability to capture meaning, intention, and unequal power relations intrinsic to participants and subject interactions and narratives.

To collect the data, the study will collect data by a combination of two dominant research methods:

semi-structured in-depth interviews and document analysis. Semi-structured in-depth interviews facilitate conversations that are both guided and flexible, and provide an environment that leads participants to reveal nuanced insights and lived experiences whilst keeping the discussion on the study's core themes (DeJonckheere & Vaughn, 2019). The in-depth interviews will prompt participants to reflect upon and provide an account of how the U.S.-China competition is influencing economic policies, geopolitical alignments, and diplomatic strategies in the Middle East. Document analysis is the other method of data collection for this study which consists of the analysis of literature including academic publications, official government statements from state actors, international news reports, and strategic policy documents. This triangulation of data sources will reinforce and contribute to a comprehensive, rigorous, and trustworthy interpretation of the research subject.

The study population comprises individuals with substantial expertise and strategic experience in fields relevant to the research topic, including international relations, economic diplomacy, technological policy, and regional alliances. Selecting these individuals from multiple scenarios includes the professionals' and scholars' extensive knowledge of US-China political relations and the implications of that dynamic within the political context of the Middle East. The study sample also consisted of thematic elements within four professionals—political strategists and analysts and scholars—or news journalists that have either participated firsthand or studied global political phenomena. This sample of 40 individuals were purposively sampled using 'purposive sampling', which is one of the best qualitative techniques for researchers that do not seek to generalize their findings but rather present a rich holistic understanding by incorporating the voices of experts (Campbell et al., 2020).

The data was analyzed using a thematic analysis process articulated by Braun and Clarke (2022). Thematic analysis is a systematic process of identifying, analyzing, and reporting repetitive patterns (themes) found in either interview transcriptions and/or documentary sources (Mattimoe et al., 2021). This approach is significant

because it can employ cultural formations cognizant of variance in the nature of perspectives while being cognizant of the overlaps (similarities) among elite voices in political, academic or media scenarios have had on the representatives (Özden, 2024). Thus, as a method, thematic analysis seeks to provide an interpretative synthesis that indicates how states, particularly Israel, determine their institutional responses to conform or reject the authority of the US aligning or resisting growing influence of China from a great-power competition context in the evolving world order. The key design feature of the methodology achieves a comprehensive understanding of shifts towards strategic alignments in response to great-power competition evident in 21st century articulations.

4. Results

The principal findings of the research were drawn from semi-structured interviews and document analysis assessing how the increasing economic and technological competition between the US and China is shaping the strategic realignment in the Middle East, primarily Israel. The findings are organized by theme to illustrate the complexity of how this great-power competition affects foreign policy, infrastructure investment, digital innovation, military balance, energy markets, and regional diplomacy. Each theme offers insight into how Israel and other regional actors are attempting to address the pressures of great-power competition while navigating the needs for sovereignty, economic development, and strategic options within a fragmented and multipolar global order.

Theme 1: Economic Rivalry and Strategic Positioning in the Middle East

Participants pointed out that the growing economic rivalry of the United States and China is putting Middle Eastern countries in difficult strategic positions. A political analyst pointed out, "*Countries like Israel find themselves in a paradox—they want to take advantage of Chinese investment without hindering their security alliance with the U.S.*" A scholar added "*We're not just talking about trade—this is about re-balancing long-standing alliances against new economic pressures.*" The economic entanglement and technological decoupling between China and the U.S. have caused many states to play spin the bottle politically. Rolf and Schindler (2022)

argue that this rivalry is referred to as techno-capitalist ambition and makes it increasingly difficult for states to stay neutral. Winkler (2023) similarly emphasizes how global tech decoupling is forcing nations to choose or balance between competing power blocs, which mirrors Israel's cautious diplomacy.

Theme 2: China's Belt and Road Initiative and Regional Infrastructure

Diplomacy

Participants agreed regarding the transformative nature of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for regional infrastructure. A participant from a regional policy institute explained, "*The BRI is not just roads and ports—it's a soft power strategy. China offers economic growth without asking political questions.*" A second participant added, "*In Haifa and Ashdod, you can see the BRI's footprint. And the BRI brings a new kind of Chinese presence in Israeli infrastructure.*" Unlike the military geo- strategy of the United States, China has pursued geo-economic access and investment from the BRI (Ghani & Khan, 2022). Anami (2024) adds that the BRI offers an alternative development model for regional states that have sought to diversify away from Western-influenced grants and financing.

Theme 3: Technological Influence on Innovation and Cybersecurity in

Israel

U.S.-China technological competition is significant in Israel's ecosystem of innovation. A cybersecurity expert mentioned: "*We are getting funding and technology from the U.S., but China is offering AI and data centers that we can't ignore. It's just the reality of this landscape.*" A researcher from a university said: "*The pressure is mounting—one misstep, and it could affect our 5G rollout or even our research funding.*" Zhang (2024) explains that the U.S. and China are in a strategic competition over the national security technologies of 5G, AI, and semiconductors. Kavar (2023) argues that U.S. legislation such as the CHIPS Act shows that technological preeminence is connected to foreign policy. The cybersecurity policy and partnerships for innovation in Israel, therefore, concern the embedded strategic competition of the U.S. and China.

Theme 4: Shifts in Military and Strategic Balance Due to Great Power

Engagement

Many participants noted that military alignments in the Middle East are changing. An Israeli defense official who is now retired said, *"The United States will still always be our number one ally, but we cannot act as if China is not giving our neighbors drones and missile technology."* Another military analyst commented, *"It is no longer only the United States who will be setting the military agenda. China is beginning to change too."* Chivvis and others (2024) note that the U.S. has become more selective in its military interventions and allowed for other actors. Al Shidhani and Baig (2024) also argue that growing military-technical engagement with countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, will change the military balance in the Middle East and challenge Israel's longstanding security arrangements.

Theme 5: Israel's Diplomatic Balancing Act Between the U.S. and China

Participants described the tension between economic cooperation with China and strategic alignment with the U.S. as "Israel's tightrope walk." One diplomat stated, *"Every Chinese investment has an American question mark."* A senior government advisor said that *"the cases of the Haifa port and Sorek plant taught us that we do not operate in a vacuum."* As Sobol (2022) noted, the U.S. has actively intervened on behalf of U.S. interests to restrict Chinese involvement in Israeli infrastructure - compelling Israel to create the Advisory Committee on Foreign Investment. Shichor (2025) noted how U.S. national security issues trumped economic reasoning in multiple Israelidecisions and forced Israel to take a more restrictive approach toward China, despite potential economic rationales.

Theme 6: Impacts on Trade, Energy Markets, and Economic Realignment

Participants reflected on the rivalry's effect on local energy markets and trade. An energy economist explained *"Israel's new gas discoveries give it leverage—but now that leverage is shaped by who we export to, and under what geopolitical pressure."*; while a journalist said *"It is not a coincidence that U.S. and Chinese firms are bidding on energy projects—it is a competition that is*

happening without the headlines." Ryan and Burman (2024) argue that energy infrastructures have emerged as an important site of geostrategic influence during the U.S.–China rivalry. Katulis and others (2025) then underscore that, as an emerging energy exporter, Israel would find its own interests overlapped with broader geopolitical interests, which are consequential as global energy independence and transitions to renewables have become strategic.

Theme 7: Future Regional Alliances and Diplomatic Realignments

Participants emphasized that continuing U.S.-China competition will have longer-term implications on Israel's diplomatic posture. A foreign policy strategist observed, *"We may have to rethink, now, who our real partners in a multipolar world."* One participant indicated, *"The Abraham Accords are not just about peace—they are about hedging bets in an uncertain global order."* According to Armutlu (2024), Israel's foreign policy is increasingly shaped by regional calculations amidst global uncertainty. Fleming (2021) recognizes several Middle Eastern states are embarking on "non-aligned" strategies in order to prevent being entrapped in great-power politics, a theme which Israel may be able to reflect upon when considering the future context of its alliances in a fractured global system.

5. Discussion

The study's findings demonstrate how the increasing economic and technological rivalry between the United States and China is reshaping the geopolitical landscape and strategic partnerships in the Middle East, specifically Israel. Based on interviews with 40 participants and the new scholarly research, the study illustrates the multifaceted implications of this rivalry—spanning economic approaches and digital infrastructure to military redirection and diplomatic approaches.

One of the most significant findings is the dilemma concerning how Middle Eastern states deal with the need to balance ties between two global superpowers. More specifically, this research demonstrated that Israel is attempting to balance its ability to enjoy the economic benefits from Chinese investment while maintaining its strategic partner relationship with the United States. This finding corresponds with Winkler's (2023) view that the global technological

decoupling puts states in a box and they must either choose a side or rely on complicated balancing mechanisms. The notion of techno-capitalist rivalry as articulated by Rolf and Schindler (2022) is important in this context where this rivalry is not simply economic but profoundly geopolitical thereby reinforcing the notion that current strategic positioning is dictated by technology allegiance or dependency.

The study also indicated that China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has made a significant advance in its role in Israel and in the region as a result of its infrastructure development. The study's observations align with the analyses of Ghani and Khan (2022), who noted that China's geo-economic ambitions are part of a broad strategy in the Middle East. China's emphasis on economic cooperation while avoiding political interference distinguishes it from Western countries, which engaged with local actors through conditionality. Anami (2024) supplements this argument by noting how the BRI became a tempting alternative for regional states, leading to a variety of investment frameworks rather than the West's, which have thresholds for investment. This confirms what was learned, that infrastructure diplomacy stems from the broader planning of economic partnerships, not just development. In all cases, the BRI is a strategic way in which China seeks to entrench itself effectively in the economic and political order in countries across the region.

A relevant aspect that emerged from the study has to do with the impact of U.S.- China technological competition, especially with Israel's innovation ecosystem and its cybersecurity policy. The findings echoed Zhang's (2024) description of 5G, artificial intelligence, and semiconductor technologies being matters of national security, in which global superiority is at stake and contested. Kavar's (2023) examination of the CHIPS Act reinforced the study's insight that the U.S. is utilizing domestic legislation to assert its technological superiority and criminalizing allied infrastructure in the process. Connectedly, Israel's innovation policy is being shaped increasingly by circumstance-compliance to U.S. technocratic legality, while also attempting to remain economically viable through technological collaboration with China.

The research also reveals a notable shift in the

military balance in the region, with China emerging as a growing supplier of military technologies to Middle Eastern countries, including some of Israel's neighbors. This is consistent with Chivvis and others (2024), who found a decline in US appetite for direct military intervention, thereby allowing new actors, such as China, to step in. Al Shidhani and Baig (2024) support this contention in their analysis of China's increasing military-technical ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia. The implications of this shift reveals that Israel must now account for a more diverse and unpredictable security environment in which the US as military hegemon is not guaranteed and regional rivalries are informed by global alignments .

The research continues to document the complexity of Israel's foreign policy challenges in attempting to navigate diplomatic balancing acts with both the US and China. This finding goes hand-in-hand with Sobol's (2022) account of US interventionism with respect to Israeli decisions around infrastructure and Shichor's (2025) documentation of how strategic needs have often supplanted economic imperatives. The establishment of Israel's Advisory Committee on Foreign Investment as a concession on Israeli autonomy under US pressure is the direct result of these tensions. This dynamic demonstrates how geopolitical rivalry restricts national sovereignty for states directly integrated with both powers .

Finally, the research suggests how the US-China rivalry potentially has larger implications for regional alliances and economic structures that underscore market integration, especially with respect to energy markets. As Ryan and Burman (2024) note, energy infrastructure has become a point of geopolitical competition and with Israel's emerging role as an energy exporter, this complicates its strategic calculations even more. Katulis and others (2025) suggest that energy independence and transitions to renewables are no longer only economic imperatives, but strategic requirements in a new global politics. The research also suggests that Israel may increasingly adopt a hedging strategy similar to other regional actors identified by Fleming (2021) to come to terms with a multipolar world. Thus, viewing the Abraham Accords and other diplomatic changes as not only peace frameworks but pragmatic moves within a changing global order may provide new

perspectives on Israel's strategic calculus.

6. Conclusion

The findings of this study clearly demonstrate that the economic and technological rivalry between the United States and China is significantly reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, particularly in Israel. Through a qualitative examination of expert insights and respective documentation on this issue. The findings indicate various economic aspects of the rivalry's impact on regional infrastructure, innovation, energy markets, and militarized alignments. Israel, being a technologically advanced state, is well-positioned at a crossroads of rivaling global powers while potentially reaping economic advantages offered by Chinese investments but abbreviated by its long-established security relations with the United States. Ultimately these findings validate well-established scholarship on techno-capitalist rivalry and geo-economic power, including those by Rolf and Schindler (2022), Zhang (2024), and Winkler (2023), who document how the bifurcation of competing global technology spheres alters the diplomatic work of states within that landscape.

The research identifies several trends which are noteworthy: the growing soft- power influence of China's Belt and Road Initiative in the Middle East; the growing importance of technological superiority as a national security matter; and the experimental diversification of military and economic partnerships outside of a U.S. hegemonic footprint. The findings further illustrate how global rivalry extends not only to traditionally militarized domains but also infrastructure, digital security, and energy policy which are spheres of action impacting national decision-making and sovereignty. Scholars such as Ghani and Khan (2022), Kavar (2023), and Katulis and others (2025) have established that infrastructure strategy, cybersecurity, and energy independence are now core elements of foreign policy-making. As seen in the case of Israel, diplomatic engagement involving these areas reflects a broader trend towards pragmatic diplomacy shaped around state interests regionally in a multipolar world order.

Despite being clear on the contours and distinct features of these dynamics, the research also reveals unanswered questions for future exploration. It is

uncertain how resilient Israel's balancing act will continue to be in the light of rising tensions between the U.S. and China. Future research could be undertaken to examine how the prospects for Israeli diplomatic agency would be affected under conditions of domestic political change, shocks to the international economy, or regional crises. The potential implications of developments in emerging technology fields like quantum computing, collaborative green energy, and digital surveillance--discussions only touched on here--

--would also benefit from future inquiry in light of anticipated strategic re-alignments. As the Middle East increasingly becomes embroiled in global powers' rivalry; it will be essential for the necessity of the contemporary adaptive, forward-looking, and multidimensional strategies for foreign policy to be sustained not simply as profitable but essential to their very national survival in forming overwhelming appears as a pressure for regional stability.

7. References

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